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DECEIT AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
IN MARYLAND
Falsehood is dangerous. The law recognizes that the victim of a false
statement may suffer personal injury, property damage, or pecuniary loss
as surely as may the victim of another's careless act.' Traditionally the
torts of libel and slander have allowed recovery to victims of defamatory
false statements, and the tort of deceit has provided recovery for false state-
ments fraudulently made.2 But in Maryland and elsewhere, courts have been
cautious in permitting recovery in tort for loss caused by misrepresentations
that have been made in good faith, but carelessly. As a result of this judicial
caution, the Maryland case law on this subject is confused and perhaps some-
what contradictory. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the distinc-
tion between the traditional common law action for deceit and the more
modern action for negligent misrepresentation first recognized by the Court
of Appeals as a valid cause of action in Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v.
Schuman.3
COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LIABILITY
FOR MISREPRESENTATION
Misrepresentation is a material component of a number of torts. For
example, as Prosser has stated, misrepresentation may constitute an ele-
ment of claims for battery, false imprisonment, trespass, or conversion.4
Such examples of misrepresentation customarily have not been treated as
separate bases of liability; rather, they typically have been merged with
the primary claim.5 At common law the only tort remedy available to a
plaintiff who had relied to his injury upon misrepresentation was the writ
of deceit,6 established as a cause of action in tort by Pasley v. Freeman3
In Pasley the King's Bench adopted the rule that "fraud without damage,
and damage without fraud gives no cause of action, but where the two
1. See Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARv. L. REv. 184, 190
(1900) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
2. See text accompanying notes 7-19 infra.
3. 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938).
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105 at 683 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
5. Id., § 105 at 684.
6. Id., § 105 at 684-85.
7. 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789). Prior to Pasley there existed an action on the
case for deceit. See Baily v. Merrell, 81 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B. 1616).
(651)
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concur, an action lies."'8 As to the components of fraud, the opinion indi-
cated that a false statement would constitute fraud if made both with a
knowledge of the falsity of the matter asserted and with an intent to
induce action in reliance upon the statement. 9
The rule of Pasley v. Freeman seemed to encompass only those situa-
tions where actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation on the
part of the defendant could be shown. In Taylor v. Ashtan'0 plaintiff
brought an action in deceit against particular bank directors for false and
fraudulent misrepresentations contained in a published report that stated
in substance that the bank was in a flourishing state financially. The
Pasley rule was explicitly extended to include otherwise fraudulent state-
ments which the defendant did not believe to be true, but which he did
not know to be false.1 ' The landmark case of Derry v. Peek12 concerned
a similar factual situation. An action for deceit was brought against di-
rectors of a tramway company which had issued a prospectus containing
false statements upon which the plaintiff had relied to his detriment. The
trial judge found as a matter of fact that while the statements in the
prospectus were untrue, they were made with an honest although unreason-
able belief in their truth on the part of the directors. He therefore held
that the directors were not liable in the action for deceit. In Peek v.
Derry13 the English Court of Appeals reversed, attempting to extend the
action of deceit to include those cases where a defendant's statement had
8. 100 Eng. Rep. at 453.
9. Id. at 453-54. In addition it was recognized that an action for deceit could not
lie where the plaintiff was in a position to discover the fraud, but carelessly failed to
do so: "Undoubtedly where the common prudence and caution of man are sufficient
to guard him, the law will not protect him in his negligence." Id. at 457 (Lord
Kenyon, C.J.). Thus, in an action on the case for deceit, where it was within a
carrier's means to discover the truth by weighing goods entrusted to him, he could
not recover when an overage was subsequently discovered, as in Baily v. Merrell, 81
Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B. 1616), or where a purchaser had the means to determine the true
state of title to real estate by inspecting the title deeds, he could not recover if he
had failed to so inspect. 100 Eng. Rep. at 457. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in
Pasley had relied upon the fraudulent assertion that a third party was a safe credit
risk. Because there was no other ready means to evaluate that person's credit, the
failure to discover the falsity of the defendant's statement did not constitute negligence.
10. 152 Eng. Rep. 860 (Ex. 1843).
11. In Taylor the curious assertion was made that a defendant might be found
liable for deceit under certain circumstances when his statement had been truel Thus:
[I]f a person told that which was untrue, and told it for a fraudulent purpose,
and with the intention to induce another to do an act, and that act was done to
the prejudice of the plaintiff, then an action for fraud would lie. . . . [Ilt [is]
not necessary to show that the defendants knew that the fact they stated to be
untrue; . . . it [is] enough that the fact was untrue, if they communicated that
fact for a deceitful purpose . . . . [I]f they stated a fact which was true for a
fraudulent purpose, they at the same time not believing that fact to be true,
in that case it would be both a legal and moral fraud.
Id. at 866.
12. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
13. 37 Ch. D. 541 (C.A. 1887).
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been made recklessly, without knowledge of its truth or falsity, or where
the statement was "untrue in fact but believed to be true, but without
any reasonable ground for such belief.' 4 This decision, which allowed
recovery in deceit for a negligent misrepresentation made in good faith,
was in turn reversed by the House of Lords.1 The Lords held that in a
deceit action there must be a showing of scienter on the part of the defend-
ant, as explained by Lord Herschell in the following rule:
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of
fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved
when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) know-
ingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and
third as distinct cases, I think that the third is but an instance of the
second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can
have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false
statement being fraudulent, there must, I think always be an honest
belief in its truth.16
The scienter requirement has survived to this day in England17 and many
American common law jurisdictions.' 8
The development of the common law action for deceit in Maryland
closely paralleled its development in England. In McAleer v. Horsey"9
the defendant had made certain allegedly false and fraudulent statements
to induce the plaintiff to invest in highly speculative Nevada silver mines.
Applying a rule similar to that of Pasley v. Freeman,20 the court deter-
mined that liability was established when four elements were shown: (a)
that the defendant had knowingly made a false representation; (b) that
the misrepresentation was made with an intent to induce the plaintiff to
enter a contract; (c) that the plaintiff entered the contract in reliance upon
the misrepresentation; and, (d) that the plaintiff thereby suffered damages.2 '
14. Id. at 585.
15. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
16. 14 App. Cas. at 374. The opinions of the Lords in Derry v. Peek were
delivered seriatim; Lord Herschell's opinion is considered controlling. See, e.g., Smith,
supra note 1, at 185; Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 679, 685 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
17. See, e.g., Akerhielm v. DeMare, (1959) App. Cas. 789, 806 (J.C.).
18. See, e.g., Sledge & Norfleet Co. v. Mann, 193 Ark. 884, 103 S.W2d 630
(1937) ; Ramsey v. Reynierson, 200 Ky. 624, 255 S.W. 274 (1923) ; Lickus v. O'Don-
nell, 321 Ill. App. 144, 52 N.E.2d 271 (1943); Carney v. Farmers & Merchants St
Bank, 196 Minn. 1, 263 N.W. 901 (1935); Sedgwick v. National Bank, 295 Mo.
230, 243 S.W. 893 (1922) ; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N.Y. 124, 41 N.E. 414 (1895);
Polley v. Boehck Equip. Co., 273 Wis. 432, 78 N.W.2d 737 (1956).
19. 35 Md. 439 (1872).
20. The rule is set out in the text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
21. 35 Md. at 453. The Court of Appeals noted that an exception to this rule
would exist under the doctrine of caveat emptor. Under this doctrine, in an action
between vendor and vendee concerning an affirmation or representation with regard
to real estate, a plaintiff would be unable to recover in deceit even though the false
statements were made fraudulently and with knowledge of falsity on the part of the
19761
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This rule was subsequently applied in several cases, 22 the Court of
Appeals reaffirming the requirement of actual knowledge of falsity on the
part of the defendant.2 3 However, in Phelps v. George's Creek & Cumber-
land Railroad Co. 24 the scienter requirement was articulated more broadly,
in terms quite similar to those later formulated by the English Court of
Appeals in Peek v. Derry.2 5 In Phelps the Maryland Court of Appeals
approved a jury instruction stating that recovery in deceit could be had
where the defendant had made a false statement without reasonable belief
in its truth.2 6 Admitting that the trial judge's statement of the law had
been "liberal, ' 27 the Court of Appeals nevertheless endorsed the instruction.
Phelps supplied the potential for the creation of a remedy in deceit for
negligent misrepresentation in that from a finding of unreasonable belief,
"legal" or "constructive" fraudulent intent could be inferred. 28
This apparent extension of the action of deceit to include negligent
misrepresentation was again articulated nine years later in Robertson v.
Parks,2 9 decided three years after the House of Lords' decision in Derry
defendant. Id. at 457, citing Medbury v. Watson, 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 259 (1843).
With the decline of the doctrine of caveat emptor, this exception has passed into
oblivion. See Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955).
22. E.g., Lamm v. Port Deposit Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 49 Md. 233 (1878) ; Busch-
man v. Codd, 52 Md. 202 (1879).
23. Id. at 207. In Buschman the plaintiffs had been induced to purchase a half
interest in an artificial marble manufacturing business by defendant's statements to the
effect that the business was flourishing, and that the company had several large
contracts to supply building materials. The plaintiffs were able to recover because
the statements were deemed to concern ascertainable facts rather than mere matters
of opinion. In dicta, the court explained when the plaintiff's state of mind would
prevent him from recovering in deceit. The court noted that the plaintiff could
recover only if the misrepresentation concerned facts which were peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant or if the nature of the misrepresentation would have
reasonably induced the plaintiff to refrain from making the usual prudent inquiries.
Recovery would thus be precluded if the quality of the matter were obvious to a person
of normal intelligence or if the parties were shown to have had equal means of
acquiring information through ordinary inquiry or diligence. Id. at 208. The effect of
this dicta was to recognize what in essence amounted to a defense of contributory
negligence to an action for deceit. Other jurisdictions have avoided this notion and
it is probably not the majority rule today. See, e.g., Bohlen, Misrepresentation as
Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733, 739-40 (1929) [hereinafter
cited as Bohlen, Misrepresentation].
24. 60 Md. 536 (1883).
25. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
26. 60 Md. at 548.
27. Id. at 554.
28. For a discussion of "legal" and "constructive" fraud, see note 53 infra. The
court's approval of the instruction may be explained by the fact that it was initially
offered to the trial court as a prayer by the defendant. 60 Md. at 542. Had the
plaintiff offered such a prayer, and had it been accepted by the trial court, it probably
would have been rejected on appeal. In spite of his odd generosity to the plaintiff in
conceding a possible recovery in deceit for no more than negligence, the defendant
prevailed on the merits.
29. 76 Md. 118, 24 A. 411 (1892).
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v. Peek. In Robertson the court explained that in an action for deceit,
"[i] t is only necessary to show that the defendant pretended to a knowledge
which he must, according to principles of reason and good faith, have known
he did not possess at the time of the representation made."' 30 Twelve years
after the Robertson decision, however, the Court of Appeals in Cahill v.
Applegarth3 1 expressly approved the rule of Derry v. Peek, thereby drawing
the line for actionable scienter to exclude mere negligence.
At this time the Maryland Court of Appeals was quite restrictive in
permitting recovery in deceit actions. In Boulden v. Stilwell,3 2 for example,
the defendants, president and vice president of a closely held corporation,
staged an elaborate charade to induce the plaintiff, who was secretary and
treasurer of the corporation, to sell his stock in the corporation to the
defendants for approximately one-fourth its real value. The defendants
staged mock quarrels between themselves in the plaintiff's presence; they
falsely informed the plaintiff that the corporation was losing money and
that it was going to "fall down"; and one defendant falsely told the plaintiff
that he had sold his share of the business to the other defendant, who as
majority stockholder was about to discharge the plaintiff and to force the
plaintiff to sell his stock for almost nothing. Recovery was denied the
plaintiff not only because most of the defendants' false statements concerned
future events rather than past or present facts,3 3 but also because the
plaintiff, as secretary and treasurer, was in a position to know that many
30. Id. at 131-32, 24 A. at 412-13. The court cited Joice v. Taylor, 6 G. & J. 54
(Md. 1833), to support this rule. Joice was not an action in deceit, however, but an
action in equity to rescind a mortgage contract. In equitable actions for recission it
was never necessary for a plaintiff to show that the defendant's false statement was
wilfully or even negligently made: "The gist of the inquiry is, not whether the party
making the statement knew it to be false, but whether the statement made as true
was believed to be true, and therefore, if false, deceived the party to whom it was
made." Id. at 58 (emphasis in original). See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third
Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 237 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Misrepre-
sentation].
31. 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904). In Cahill the trial court had allowed recovery
against a bank director whose negligent misrepresentation that his bank was in a
"prosperous condition and making money" had induced the plaintiff to purchase bank
stock. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
A bank officer may be, and generally is, liable for his want of reasonable care,
or in other words for his negligence, but it does not follow that he had been guilty
of fraud, or that he can be sued in a form of action that depends upon fraud for
its foundation.
... [T]his is an action for deceit. If it were a bill in equity to rescind the contract
different principles might be applied .... "In such a case the Court will . ..
rescind the contract without any fraudulent intent being shown, without any
knowledge actual or constructive on the part of the vendor that the statements
were in fact false."
Id. at 503-04, 56 A. at 797, citing Trimble v. Reid, 97 Ky. 713, 31 S.W. 861 (1895),
and Joice v. Taylor, 6 G. & J. 54 (Md. 1833), discussed in note 30 supra.
32. 100 Md. 543, 60 A. 609 (1905).
33. Id. at 556, 60 A. at 612.
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of the defendants' statements were false. 34 The court additionally ruled
that there could never be recovery in deceit for false assertions as to the
ownership of stock,3 5 apparently misinterpreting a statement in an earlier
case that such an assertion was not "material. '8 6
In Gittings v. Von Dorn3 7 the Court of Appeals outlined five pre-
requisites for recovery in deceit: (a) false representation made by the
defendant; (b) knowledge of falsity or such reckless indifference to truth
as to impute knowledge to the defendant; (c) an intent to defraud the
plaintiff by means of the misrepresentation; (d) justified reliance by the
plaintiff upon the misrepresentation, and action thereupon; and, (e) dam-
age directly resulting therefrom.38 These prerequisites for recovery were
repeated some thirty years later in Appel v. Hupfeld39 and are now firmly
established as the rule by 'which deceit actions are decided in Maryland.40
34. Id. Plaintiff had testified that the defendants had not permitted him to open
a set of books for the company until well after its operations had commenced, so that
plaintiff did not know, and could not easily have ascertained, the financial condition
of the company at the time that he sold his stock to the defendants. Id. at 554, 60 A.
at 611.
35. Id. at 556, 60 A. at 612.
36. In support of this general rule, the court cited Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md.
493, 56 A. 794 (1904), discussed in note 31 supra. In Cahill, the court had indicated
that, under the facts of that case, a false representation by a bank president as to the
real ownership of stock that he was trying to sell was not material. Id. at 505, 56
A. at 798. In Cahill, the plaintiff had not been induced to buy the stock by the de-
fendant's statement that he owned it. In Boulden, on the other hand, the misrepre-
sentation concerning ownership of the stock was material, as it was part of the larger
conspiracy by the defendants to persuade the plaintiff that the company was going to
"fall down," and that one of the defendants had sold out his interest to the other.
Thus in Boulden the court converted the specific finding of immateriality in Cahill
into a general rule that no statement concerning the ownership of stock could ever
support a deceit action.
37. 136 Md. 10, 109 A. 553 (1920).
38. The rule in Gittings was stated as follows:
To entitle the plaintiff to recover it must be shown: (1) that the representation
made is false; (2) that its falsity was either known to the speaker, or the mis-
representation was made with such a reckless indifference to truth as to be equiva-
lent to actual knowledge; (3) that it was made for the purpose of defrauding the
person claiming to be injured thereby; (4) that such person not only relied upon
the misrepresentation, but had a right to rely upon it in the full belief of its
truth, and that he would not have done the thing from which the injury resulted
had not such misrepresentation been made; and (5) that he actually suffered
damage directly resulting from such fraudulent misrepresentation.
Id. at 15-16, 109 A. at 554.
39. 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951).
40. The rule of Gittings v. Von Dorn was stated verbatim in the following
cases: Casale v. Dooner Laboratories, Inc., 503 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1973) (scienter
requirement not satisfied); Canatella v. Davis, 264 Md. 190, 198, 286 A2d 122, 126
(1972) (scienter requirement: not satisfied); James v. Goldberg, 256 Md. 520, 528-29,
261 A.2d 753, 758 (1970) (reliance by plaintiff held to be unreasonable, and falsehood
held not actionable) ; Lambert v. Smith, 235 Md. 284, 287, 201 A.2d 491, 493
(1964) (scienter requirement not satisfied) ; Lustine Chevrolet v. Cadeux, 19 Md.
656 [VOL. 35
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By adopting the scienter requirement of Derry v. Peek, the Court
of Appeals, despite appearances, did not in actuality constrict the scope of
liability in deceit actions in Maryland. From a study of the foregoing
Maryland cases, it is apparent that no opinion of the court had ever
affirmatively held that a defendant could be liable for a statement made
with an honest belief in its truth. Phelps v. George's Creek & Cumberland
Railroad Co.41 and Robertson v. Parks42 came closest when the court
intimated that a defendant might be liable if he made his statement without
reasonable grounds for believing its truth. It still remained as a require-
ment for recovery, however, that the statement be made with a "fraudulent
purpose," that is, a design to defraud the plaintiff through a statement made
"without a bona fide belief in its truth. '43 What Derry v. Peek and the
Maryland cases that have followed it have done is merely to articulate in
rigid, mechanistic terms the vague evidentiary standard by which fraud
had been determined in earlier cases. Thus while it appeared both in
Robertson and in Phelps that the court had extended liability to all cases
where the defendant's asserted belief in his statement was unreasonable,
this was but an evidentiary aid: unreasonable belief was merely evidence
of the defendant's actual knowledge that his statement was untrue.4 4 The
common law courts prior to Derry v. Peek had been unwilling to set forth
a rule delineating the precise requirements for recovery in deceit because
they recognized that the articulation of the elements of fraud might enable
App. 30, 34-35, 308 A2d 747, 750 (1973) (insufficient causal connection between
misrepresentation and injury).
It should be noted that a federal tort action has developed through Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), in
circumstances where fraud has been committed in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities. The action has been given a rather broad scope. See Superintendent
v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Brune, Rule 10b-5 and the General
Law as to Deceit in Securities Transactions in Maryland, 33 MD. L. REv. 129 (1973) ;
Comment, Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for Negligently Misleading Corporate Releases:
A Proposal for The Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 162 (1973).
41. 60 Md. 536 (1883).
42. 76 Md. 118, 24 A. 411 (1892).
43. Id. at 131, 24 A. at 412.
44. "[G]ross negligence [does not], in construction of law, amount to fraud, but
[is] only evidence to be left to the jury, from which they might infer fraud, or want
of bona fides. .. ." Wilson v. York & Md. Line R.R., 11 G. & J. 58, 79 (Md. 1839).
In Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904), it was asserted that those
cases that had permitted recovery without proof of actual knowledge of falsity on
the part of a defendant were cases where defendant's knowledge had been imputed
from evidence of a lesser state of mind than that of actual knowledge. For example,
actual knowledge could be inferred from the fact that the defendant had no reasonable
grounds for believing that his statement was true. Yet this inference could be avoided
by evidence that the defendant honestly, although unreasonably, believed in the truth
of his statement. Id. at 502-03, 56 A. at 797. This distinction was most succinctly
articulated by Lord Bramwell in Derry v. Peek, referring to the ruling of the Court
of Appeal below as "a confusion of unreasonableness of belief as evidence of dis-




artful swindlers better to avoid the appearance of fraud and thereby escape
liability for their fraudulent acts.45 Specific states of mind, such as careless-
ness, recklessness, indifference as to truth or falsity, or disbelief in truth,
were not intended to be taken as substantive parameters of culpability.
Rather, they were to be considered evidence in determining whether a
defendant possessed an intent to deceive the plaintiff, referred to in the
cases as "fraudulent intent." 46 The adoption of the scienter requirement of
Derry v. Peek by the Maryland courts, then, has been more a crystallization
of evidentiary standards than a substantive alteration of liability in deceit.
The actual scope of liability under the tort of deceit as it exists today
is firmly supported by important policy considerations. In England and in
many jurisdictions of the United States,4 7 including Maryland, judges have
been unwilling to broaden the deceit action to reach defendants whose false
statements were honestly. made due to the negative connotations attendant
upon a charge of fraud. A defendant found guilty of deceit is by implication
dishonest, perhaps morally deficient, and certainly not to be trusted. 48 The
consequences of a deceit action can be commercially and socially disastrous
to the defendant 9.4  Hence, in these jurisdictions, the action for deceit has
45. Thus, in McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439 (1872), it was stated:
The common law not only gives no definition of fraud, but perhaps wisely asserts
as a principle that there shall be no definition of it, for, as it is the very nature and
essence of fraud to elude all laws in fact, without appearing to break them in
form, a technical definition of fraud . . .would be in effect telling to the crafty
how precisely to avoid the grasp of the law.
Id. at 452.
46. In Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789), fraudulent intent was
generally described as an intent to persuade the plaintiff to undertake a course of action
desired by the defendant in reliance upon a statement which the defendant did not
believe to be true. Id. at 456; accord Lickus v. O'Donnell, 321 Ill. App. 144, 52
N.E.2d 271 (1943).
47. See cases at note 18 and accompanying text supra.
48. Lord Bramwell indicated in Derry v. Peek that the word "fraud" in common
parlance was reserved for actions of great turpitude, and thus should not be applied
to a lesser breach of moral duty such as negligence. 14 App. Cas. at 351-52. Professor
Williston stated that "[t]he use of the words 'fraud' and 'deceit' have probably exer-
cised an unfortunate influence upon the development of the law on the subject."
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415, 434 (1911)
[hereinafter cited as Williston].
49. As stated by Stirling, J., the trial judge quoted with approval by Lord
Bramwell in Derry v. Peek:
[M]ercantile men dealing with matters of business would be the first to cry out
if I extended the notion of deceit into what is honestly done in the belief that
these things would come about, and when they did not come about, make them
liable in an action of fraud.
14 App. Cas. at 349; accord Donnelly v. Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co., 102
Md. 1, 61 A. 301 (1905), where the Court of Appeals, referring to an exaggerated
statement in the prospectus, stated:
[I]f it had been [a cause of the plaintiff's damages], it would be a very slight
foundation for a verdict, which has as its result a stain upon the character of
reputable men ...by branding them as parties to a fraud ....
Id. at 17, 61 A. at 307-08.
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been restricted to circumstances where it can be proved that the defendant's
behavior was such as could be characterized as morally reprehensible. 50
This is reflected by the fact that in a few jurisdictions including Maryland,
a higher standard of proof is required in deceit actions than the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" test that is the standard for most other tort actions.51
The need for a remedy in tort for persons who had reasonably relied
to their detriment upon negligently made misrepresentations was recognized
by courts and commentators alike,52 but differences of opinion arose as to
the method of providing it. Some jurisdictions, ignoring Derry v. Peek,
chose to extend the scope of the deceit action to include cases where the
defendant honestly though unreasonably believed in the truth of his state-
ment . 5 A few jurisdictions chose to allow recovery in tort for misrepre-
50. As explained by the Maryland Court of Appeals:
[N]either the common law nor any code of human laws seeks to enforce the rule
of perfect morality declared by divine authority, which acknowledges as its one
principle the duty of doing to others as we would that others should do to us,
and which, by consequence, absolutely excludes and prohibits all cunning and
craft or astuteness practiced by any one for his own exclusive benefit. And it
thence follows that a certain amount of selfish cunning passes unrecognized by
courts of justice, and that a man may procure to himself, in his dealings with
others, some advantages to which he has no moral right, but to which he may
succeed in establishing a perfect legal title. But if anyone carries this too far:
if by craft and selfish contrivance he inflicts an injury upon his neighbor and
acquires a benefit to himself beyond a certain point, the law steps in [and] ...
rectifies the wrong by sustaining an action for the deceit.
McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 451-52 (1872) quoted in Boulden v. Stilwell, 100
Md. 543, 551-52, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905).
51. For recovery in deceit, Maryland requires that fraud be proved by "clear
and convincing" evidence. Peurifoy v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 254 Md. 501, 255
A.2d 332 (1969) (dictum) ; Loyola Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Trenchcraft, Inc.,
17 Md. App. 646, 303 A.2d 432 (1973) ; see Bachrach v. Washington United Coopera-
tive, Inc., 181 Md. 315, 321, 29 A.2d 822, 825 (1943). A minority of other jurisdictions
likewise require a standard of proof greater than preponderance of the evidence in
tort actions involving fraud. 37 Am. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 468 at 642-46
(1968); see e.g., Trucker's Exchange Bank v. Conroy, 190 Miss. 242, 199 So. 301
(1940); Jewell v. Allen, 188 Okla. 374, 109 P.2d 235 (1940) ; Hughes v. Stusser,
68 Wash. 2d 707, 415 P2d 89 (1966); Polley v. Boehck Equip. Co., 273 Wis. 432,
78 N.W.2d 737 (1956).
In Trenchcraft, the Court of Special Appeals stated as part of the justification
for the higher standard that: "[p]ersonal and business reputations should not be
saddled with the stigma of fraud when the conduct complained of is basically a failure
to abide by the terms of an agreement or an understanding." 17 Md. App. at 656, 303
A.2d at 438.
52. E.g., Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742, 744-45 (1888); Angus v.
Clifford, [1891] 2 Ch. D. 449, 470 (C.A.) ; Williston, supra note 48; Smith, supra
note 1; 7 L.Q. Rzv. 107 (1891), 5 L.Q. Rv. 101 (1889).
53. This is generally accomplished either by resort to such fictions as "legal
fraud" or "constructive fraud," whereby scienter is presumed when a statement has
been made without reasonable grounds for belief in its truth, see, e.g., Watson v.
Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899) ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hendrick,
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sentations made neither wilfully nor negligently, but applied in effect a
standard of strict liability.5 4 Other jurisdictions, including Maryland, came
to permit recovery for certain negligent misrepresentations, not in an action
for deceit, but in a separate type of action the gravamen of which was
negligence. 55 In England Derry v. Peek was long interpreted to restrict
recovery in tort for negligent misrepresentation to cases involving con-
tractual or fiduciary relationships between the parties, 56 even though the
Lords had held in Derry v. Peek only that negligent misrepresentation
was an insufficient basis for a deceit claim, not precluding the development
of a separate negligence action.57 By contrast, in the United States courts
in New Hampshire and New York quickly recognized that to allow recovery
in negligence for misrepresentation would not require abandonment of the
rule in Derry v. Peek.5 8 In both states the action in negligence was given
181 Va. 824, 27 S.E.2d 198 (1943) ; Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121 (1869), or by doing
away with the scienter requirement altogether, see e.g., Williams v. Hume, 83 Ind.
App. 608, 149 N.E. 355 (1925); Prosser, Misrepresentation, supra note 30; Bohlen,
Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA.
L. REv. 703 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Bohlen, Negligence or Fraud]; Note, Tort
Liability for Negligent Language, 28 COLUM. L. Rxv. 216 (1928). This extension
of deceit has been soundly criticized for at least two reasons. First, legal fictions are
obfuscatory and lead to a misunderstanding of the law by the general public. See
Williston, supra note 48, at 435. This problem may be particularly apparent when a
deceit action is tried before a jury whose members understand the word "fraud" to
have an entirely different meaning than that given it in law. Second, and perhaps
more troubling, extension of the deceit action to include negligent misrepresentation
may tend to blur the important distinction in terms of culpability on the part of the
defendant between a statement that is known to be false and a statement that is
believed to be true. See Bohlen, Negligence or Fraud, supra at 706.
54. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. J.D. Pittman Tractor Co., 244 Ala. 354, 13
So. 2d 669 (1943) ; Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396, 37 N.W. 497 (1888) ; Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hendrick, 181 Va. 824, 27 S.E.2d 198 (1943). For extensive
analysis of tort liability for entirely innocent misrepresentation, see Hill, supra
note 16; Williston, supra note 48.
55. See, e.g., Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948) ; Virginia Dare
Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938) ; Prosser, Misrepresentation,
supra note 30, at 235; Smith, supra note 1, at 186-99
56. See, e.g., Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.);
Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932; Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B.
491 (C.A.). This interpretation remained the law in England until 1961, when it was
decided that the same recovery could be had for negligent words as for negligent
acts where the damage to the plaintiff was "physical," involving either personal
injury or property damage. Clayton v. Woodman & Son, [1962] 2 Q.B. 533, 542-46
(C.A. 1961). Two years later, in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964]
A.C. 465 (1963), the House of Lords expressed its opinion in dicta that, where only
pecuniary loss was involved, there could be recovery for negligent misrepresentation
in the absence of a contractual or fiduciary relationship, if "the speaker or writer has
undertaken some responsibility" to take reasonable care to speak the truth. Id. at 483.
57. See Smith, supra note 1, at 185.
58. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 600, 45 A. 480 (1899); Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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broad scope to permit recovery for both personal injury and pecuniary
loss.59
THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN MARYLAND
The Origin of the Action: Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman
Prior to 1938 there had been no recovery in tort for negligent mis-
representation in Maryland. In that year in Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v.
Schuman,60 the Court of Appeals allowed recovery in negligence where a
plaintiff had been seriously injured as a result of relying upon the defendant's
misrepresentation. While employed by a window washing firm hired by
the defendant to clean the walls of one of its stores, the plaintiff asked the
store manager whether it was safe to stand upon a dress case. The store
manager affirmed that it was safe, and upon the plaintiff's further hesitation
insisted that the plaintiff stand upon the case. Relying upon the manager's
assurance, the plaintiff put his full weight upon the case which immediately
collapsed, throwing plaintiff to the floor. These facts did not support an
action for deceit as there was no indication whatsoever that the manager
was aware that his assurances were false. Still the manager had been
careless in affirming that the case would support a man's weight. In per-
mitting the action for negligent misrepresentation to stand, the Court of
Appeals stated:
It appears from the declaration . . that this action is founded upon
negligence in misrepresentation. No Maryland case has been found
directly upon the subject, but the weight of authority in other juris-
dictions seems to be that such action is not necessarily confined to
injuries arising out of contractual relations; that the action lies for
negligent words, recovery being permitted when one relies on state-
ments of another, negligently volunteering an erroneous opinion in-
tending that it be acted upon and knowing that loss or injury are likely
to follow if it is acted upon. 61
In formulating its rule the court in Virginia Dare relied upon two cases
from other jurisdictions: Cunningham v. C.R. Pease Co.,6 2 and Inter-
national Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co.6 3 In Cunningham the defend-
ant had negligently assured the plaintiff's mother that it was safe to apply
stove blacking purchased from the defendant to a hot stove. The product
subsequently exploded during application, injuring the plaintiff. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff could recover in an
action for negligence, asserting that:
[A] person who acts upon a false representation made for the purpose
of inducing him to change his position may recover the damages he
59. See Carpenter, Responsibility for Negligent, Intentional and Innocent Mis-
representations, 24 ILL. L. REv. 749, 753 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter].
60. 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938).
61. Id. at 291-92, 1 A.2d at 899.
62. 74 N.H. 435, 69 A. 120 (1908).
63. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 'N.E. 662 (1927).
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sustains in an action of deceit, when the maker of the statement knew
it to be false, and in an action of negligence when he ought to have
known it to be So.64
According to the New Hampshire court in Cunningham, the action in
negligence for misrepresentation was, in effect, an action for deceit without
the requirement of scienter on the part of the defendant and with the
added defense of contributory negligence. 65
International Products involved a warehouseman's false statements
as to the location of certain goods, causing them to be uninsured when
subsequently destroyed by fire. The New York Court of Appeals, in
allowing the owner to recover, asserted: "[I] n a proper case we hold that
words negligently spoken may justify the recovery of the proximate
damages caused by faith in their accuracy." 66
Virginia Dare is the leading case respecting negligent misrepresenta-
tion in Maryland, 67 and the elements of the cause of action, derived from
Virginia Dare, include: (a) a negligently volunteered erroneous opinion;
(b) intent on the part of the defendant that the opinion be relied upon;
(c) knowledge on the part of the defendant that plaintiff's reliance would
be "likely" to cause loss or injury to him ;6s (d) action in reliance upon
the opinion by the plaintiff, and, while not explicitly mentioned in the
statement of the rule, it is a general principle of negligence that (e) the
defendant's careless conduct must have been the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. Since Virginia Dare, the issue of negligence by mis-
representation has been before the Maryland courts only infrequently.
In Holt v. Kolker69 recovery in negligence was denied to a housewife who
had fallen through the back porch of her house after relying upon state-
ments by her landlord and plumbers who were working on the porch
that it was safe to walk upon. In Piper v. Jenkins70 a deceit action in-
volving alleged misrepresentations involving a sale of land, the Court of
Appeals carefully distinguished the actions of deceit and negligent mis-
representation, relying upon Holt and Virginia Dare.71 In Brack v.
EvanS7 2 in which stockbrokers were said to have given advice to the
plaintiff concerning the purchase of stock that was "in grossly negligent,
reckless and careless disregard for the truth," 73 the Court of Appeals
64. 74 N.H. at 437, 69 A. at 121.
65. Id.
66. 244 N.Y. at 338, 155 N.E. at 664.
67. Virginia Dare has been cited in all subsequent Maryland actions involving
negligent misrepresentation except Delmarva Drilling Co. v. Tuckahoe Shopping
Center, 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 131-39
infra.
68. For a discussion of this element, see notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
69. 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948).
70. 207 Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955) (dictum).
71. Id. at 313, 113 A.2d at 921.
72. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
73. Id. at 553, 187 A.2d at 882.
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held that the facts as alleged would not support an action for deceit, but
would support recovery in negligence. 74 Subsequently in St. Paul at Chase
Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals upheld
a trial court's finding that a mortgage broker had made an actionable
negligent misrepresentation to a developer concerning the withdrawal of
a mortgage offer by a prospective mortgagee. 75 And most recently, in
Local 75, United Furniture Workers of America v. Regiec, 70 the Court
of Special Appeals permitted recovery in a negligence action in which an
employee of the union misinformed the plaintiff as to his rights under
the Union's hospitalization insurance plan, causing the plaintiff to incur
unnecessary personal liability for his hospital bills. It is from these cases
and from the law of other jurisdictions upon which our courts have relied,
that the perimeters of liability for negligent misrepresentation must be
established in Maryland. The following sections are addressed to some
of the problems that may arise in determining these perimeters.
Physical Injury and Pecuniary Loss
It has been suggested that in negligence actions involving misrepre-
sentation the law allows more liberal and comprehensive recovery where
tangible physical harm rather than mere pecuniary loss is a factor. 77 The
first Maryland cases, Virginia Dare and Holt v. Kolker7 8 involved per-
sonal injury, and while the Court of Appeals did not explicitly limit the
action to situations involving personal injury in Virginia Dare,79 that
limitation was made a part of the rule in Holts° and subsequently con-
firmed in Piper v. Jenkins.81 Despite this development the court rejected
74. Id. at 553-54, 187 A2d at 883.
75. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
76. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
77. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 178-79, 704; see Clayton v. Woodman & Son,
[1962] 2 Q.B. 533 (C.A. 1961).
78. 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948).
79. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
80. The court paraphrased the Virginia Dare rule as follows:
In Maryland there can be no recovery in an action for deceit on the ground of
negligent misrepresentation. . . . But this Court has held that in an action for
personal injury recovery may be had for negligent words where one relies on the
statements of another who negligently volunteers an erroneous opinion, intending
that it be acted upon and knowing that loss or injury are likely to follow if it is
acted upon.
189 Md. at 639, 57 A.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
81. 207 Md. 308, 313, 113 A.2d 919, 921 (1955). The Piper dictum, unlike the
statement of the rule in Holt, implied that recovery could never be had for negligent
misrepresentation absent a showing of personal injury:
The Maryland Court of Appeals, following the decision in Derry v. Peek, has
held that a false statement of fact made by a person honestly with a belief in
its truth, and relied upon by the person to whom it is made, does not constitute
such fraud as will support an action for deceit. . . . It has been held, however,
that an action will lie for personal injury resulting from reliance upon statements
1976]
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the personal injury limitation in Brack v. Evans,8 2 in which only pecuniary
loss was involved. Since the subsequent Maryland cases in which action-
able negligent misrepresentation was found to exist also involved only
pecuniary loss,8 3 this rejection was apparently permanent. The distinction
between physical harm and pecuniary loss may have developed in this
context from an understanding by the courts that the defendant in a
negligence action must be held to a higher standard of care where one
of the consequences of his activity might be serious personal injury.8 4
Regardless of the origin of the physical harm/pecuniary loss distinction,
it has been rejected in New Hampshire8 5 and New York,86 at least to
the extent that a showing of physical harm is no longer a prerequisite
for recovery in an action for negligent misrepresentation in those juris-
dictions. The type of damage suffered by a plaintiff may, however, remain
relevant as a factor in determining the degree of care required of the
defendant in determining the scope of his duty to ascertain the truth of
his representations. 87
Knowledge that Injury is Likely to Follow
One of the elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, as articulated in Virginia Dare and its progeny, is that the defendant
"kno[w] that loss or injury [is] likely to follow if [his statement] is
acted upon."8 8 This seems to indicate that the defendant must have bad
actual knowledge of the danger of loss or injury to the plaintiff. Other
language in Virginia Dare indicates that this was not the intent of the
court: "If one invites another into danger of which the former ought to be
aware, and of which the latter is ignorant, and is under no duty to
inquire, and injury follows, responsibility follows." 89 Indeed, if this ele-
ment of the rule is to be understood as requiring that the defendant be
which negligently volunteer an erroneous opinion made with intention that it
be acted upon and with knowledge that injury would likely result if acted upon.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
83. St. Paul at Chase, Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278
A.2d 12 (1971) ; Local 75, United Furniture Workers of America v. Regiec, 19 Md.
App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
84. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 146-47.
85. In Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 A. 141 (1925), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated:
But it is urged that the Cunningham case was an action for personal injuries,
and is therefore distinguishable from the case at hand. Once granting, however,
that damage has resulted from reasonable reliance upon a negligent misstatement,
it is difficult to perceive why liability should be made to depend upon the nature
of the injury sustained.
86. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
87. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
88. 175 Md. at 292, 1 A.2d at 899. See text accompanying notes 61-68 supro.
89. Id. at 297-98, 1 A.2d at 901 (emphasis added), quoting Liebold v. Green, 69
Ill. App. 527 (1897).
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aware of the potential danger to the plaintiff, then in Virginia Dare itself
recovery should have been denied since there was no evidence in that
case that the store manager was aware that the plaintiff was "likely" to
be injured if he stood upon the dress case. Had this been so, the manager
would have been guilty of fraud rather than mere negligence. A sensible
interpretation of this element is that for the defendant to be liable, he
must realize that if his statement is false, loss or injury will likely follow
if it is acted upon.
This interpretation of the element is supported by the results in
subsequent Maryland cases. In Brack v. Evans9" the plaintiff had asked
one of the defendants, a stockbroker, to purchase certain shares of stock
to be offered for sale following a twenty-five to one split. The defendant
advised the plaintiff to purchase the company's stock prior to the split,
stating that the new stock would probably be oversubscribed and that the
plaintiff would get dividends and other rights and privileges only by
purchasing the old stock. The plaintiff relied upon this advice and pur-
chased the old stock, but paid considerably more than the new stock
purchase price.9 1 Finding the arranged deal to be much less advantageous
than the defendants had represented it to be, plaintiff sued. Since the
plaintiff had not alleged facts from which defendants' knowledge of
falsity could be inferred, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
dismissal of his count charging fraud ;92 however, the court reversed the
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's negligence count, holding that the
allegations contained in the declaration were sufficient to warrant trial on
the issue of negligence, citing Virginia Dare and Holt.93 The plaintiff did
not allege that his stockbroker knew that the plaintiff was likely to lose
money as a result of relying upon the broker's advice. Had this allegation
been raised, the Court of Appeals could not have rejected the plaintiff's
count charging fraud - knowledge that the plaintiff was likely to lose
money because of reliance upon the defendant's advice was equivalent in
this situation to knowledge that the representations contained in the ad-
vice were false. If the defendant stockbroker was honestly unaware that
his advice contained misrepresentations, he could hardly have known that
loss would be the likely result from reliance upon it. Similarly in Local
75, United Furniture Workers of America v. Regiec,94 the plaintiff, who
was about to enter a hospital for surgery, inquired of his union whether
he was presently covered under its hospitalization insurance program. The
union employee who handled the program informed the hospital that
plaintiff's insurance was still effective. In fact, the plaintiff was actually
ineligible for benefits at the time of his hospitalization, and as a conse-
quence he suffered financial loss. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
90. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
91. Id. at 553, 187 A.2d at 882.
92. Id. at 553, 187 A.2d at 883.
93. Id. at 554, 187 A.2d at 883.
94. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
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because "the [defendant] chose to establish procedures whereby inquiry
was invited and answers given with the clear knowledge that such advice
would be acted upon to sway the conduct of the inquirer." 95 Undoubtedly
the defendant's employee was aware that pecuniary loss would likely
follow a mistaken assurance that the plaintiff was covered by the insurance
program. There was no indication in the case, however, that the employee
actually knew that the plaintiff was likely to incur this loss.
The Relationship Between Plaintiff and Defendant
It is generally true that in a deceit action, if fraudulent misrepre-
sentation has been proved, the scope of the defendant's liability may be
very broad, as long as the plaintiff's reliance is reasonable and he has
suffered actual damage.96 In a case of negligent misrepresentation, how-
ever, the court must carefully evaluate the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and if that relationship is only tenuous in
nature, recovery will be denied even where the elements of a cause of
action are otherwise proved. Thus in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven &
Co.,97 considered to be one of the leading cases in the field of negligent
misrepresentation, Judge Cardozo refused to find accountants, who, it was
alleged, had carelessly certified a balance sheet, liable in negligence to a
third party who had relied upon the certification in advancing a loan to
the corporation whose balance sheet had been so certified. To find negli-
gence in such a case, it was suggested, would extend the scope of liability
much too far:
"Everyone making a promise having the quality of a contract will be
under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under
another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential
beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one
relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new rela-
tions, inescapably hooked together." H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168, 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928). "The law
does not spread its protection so far."9 8
This reluctance on the part of the judiciary to permit a broad recovery in
negligence to the victims of careless but honest misrepresentation reflects
the following general principles: (a) in terms of fault a person who makes
a negligent misstatement, believing in its truth, is morally less culpable than
a person who tells a deliberate lie intending that another will rely upon it
to his detriment ;99 and, (b) liability for negligent use of words should not
be as strictly enforced as for the negligent operation of a machine, keeping
of a dangerous animal, or construction of a building. 00 Taking these con-
95. Id. at 413, 311 A.2d at 460.
96. See Prosser, Misrepresentation, supra note 30 passim.
97. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
98. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 448.
99. See Bohlen, Negligence or Fraud, supra note 53 at 706.
100. See Smith, supra note 1 at 190.
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siderations into account, specific cases have been resolved on a facts-and-
circumstances basis.
In dealing with the relationship between the parties in cases of negli-
gent misrepresentation, the Court of Appeals seems to have relied princi-
pally upon New York case law. In Holt v. Kolker'01 the plaintiff asked
both her landlord and plumbers who were installing a toilet on her back
porch whether the porch was strong enough to support her weight. All
replied that it was, one of the plumbers volunteering, "Well, if it holds a
man like me, it will hold a little woman like you.' u02 In fact, the porch was
not strong enough and the plaintiff fell through, breaking her ankle. The
court divided equally on the question of whether the landlord was liable,
but held that the plumbers were not liable because they were under no duty
to the plaintiff arising from any previous special relationship with her or
from any special knowledge concerning the porch and because their state-
ments "were such casual expressions of opinion as plaintiff was not entitled
to rely upon under the circumstances.' '103 The court cited with approval
the opinion of Judge Cardozo in Glanzer v. Shepard,10 4 in which a vendor
of beans had employed the defendant, a public weigher, to determine the
weight of a quantity to be sold to the plaintiff. The defendant negligently
certified the weight to be substantially greater than it actually was. Al-
though there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant
and the certification had not been made at the plaintiff's request, the plaintiff
was allowed to recover damages from the defendant because the defendant
had held himself out to the public as being skilled in his trade and because
the defendant had known that the plaintiff would rely upon the certificate
in making the purchase. Glanzer supports the proposition that even where
the defendant does not speak directly to the plaintiff, he may be liable for
his negligent misrepresentation where he knows that the plaintiff will act
in reliance upon it and where the plaintiff's reliance is reasonable. Judge
Cardozo stated the test for reasonable reliance as follows:
We must view the act in its setting, which will include the implications
and the promptings of usage and fair dealing. The casual response,
made in mere friendliness or courtesy . . . may not stand on the same
101. 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948).
102. Id. at 639, 57 A.2d at 288.
103. Id. at 640, 57 A.2d at 289. It is arguable that neither rationale is satisfying.
A "casual" affirmative response to a question concerning whether a second-story porch
is safe to walk upon would certainly seem to be a negligent response if the speaker
did not have reason to believe that the porch was in fact safe; when such great
physical danger is involved, reason demands that an answer be more than "casual." As
to the special relationship, the plumbers were in a better position than the plaintiff
to know whether the porch was safe since they had been working on it prior to the
accident. The only satisfactory explanation for the court's decision is that the
plumbers were not careless at all when they told the plaintiff that the porch was
safe: since neither of them had fallen through, it was reasonable under the circum-
stances to assume that the plaintiff would not.
104. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 -N.E. 275 (1922).
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plane, when we come to consider who is to assume the risk of negli-
gence or error, as the deliberate certificate, indisputably an "act in
the law" . . . intended to sway conduct. 0 5
Glanzer was followed by International Products Co. v. Erie Railroad
Co.,10 6 cited by the Maryland Court of Appeals to support the rule of
Virginia Dare. Concerning the question of the relationship between the
parties, the Court of Appeals of New York expressed these guidelines:
Not every casual response, not every idle word, however damaging
the result, gives rise to a cause of action .... Liability in such cases
arises only when there is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct
information. And that involves many considerations. There must be
knowledge or its equivalent that the information is desired for a serious
purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it;
that if false or erroneous he will because of it be injured in person or
property. Finally the relationship of the parties, arising out of con-
tract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good conscience
the one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and the
other giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.107
Thus the approach apparently adopted by Maryland from the New
York cases permits recovery for negligent words only if there is some
business or personal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
which causes the plaintiff to rely upon the defendant's statement, and which
by its nature, creates a duty on the part of the defendant to speak truthfully.
This somewhat vague requirement is complicated by whatever significance
remains in the distinction between physical damage and pecuniary loss to
the plaintiff. While the element of physical harm seems to have been
abandoned as an absolute bar to recovery, it is reasonable to suppose that
the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff remains relevant as a factor in
determining the scope of the defendant's duty to use care. Where a person's
conduct creates the risk of serious personal injury, he is under a higher
duty to exercise care than where only the risk of pecuniary loss is present. 10 8
Furthermore, situations involving the risk of physical harm may include,
in the aggregate, smaller classes of potential victims than situations where
only the risk of pecuniary loss is present. To the extent that the fear of vast
potential liability is the principal reason for the requirement of a special
relationship,1 9 the diminution of the scope of potential liability in cases
involving personal injury may reduce the need for the special relationship
in those cases.
In each of the four Maryland appellate decisions where recovery for
negligent misrepresentation has been allowed, the requisite special relation-
105. Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276.
106. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 622 (1927).
107. Id. at 337-38, 155 N.E. at 664.
108. See note 84 and text accompanying notes 78-87 supra.
109. See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.
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ship existed between the parties. In Virginia Dare the plaintiff had been
sent by his employers to clean the walls of defendant's store under the
direction of the store manager. In this situation he was under the "control
and direction" of the manager 110 and this relationship of control created
a duty on the part of the manager to employ reasonable care in ascertaining
the truth of his statements, particularly since the risk of serious personal
injury to the plaintiff was evident. The defendants in Brack v. Evans"'
and St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer's Life Insurance Co." 2 held
themselves out to the public as having expert knowledge in special fields,
respectively as stockbroker and mortgage broker.113 It was assumed that
the plaintiffs would rely upon the expertise of these defendants and the
defendants, as experts in their chosen fields, were under a duty to com-
petently advise their clients. The trial court in St. Paul at Chase quoted
from L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell" 4 as to the duty of care on the part
of the defendant:
"The Courts have uniformly based recovery upon principles of negli-
gence where there is failure to employ the knowledge, skill and judg-
ment which is engaged to be rendered in professional employment, or
other employment of a highly specialized nature. A member of the
learned professions, and for that matter any one who undertakes em-
ployment because of his possession of exceptional skill, impliedly repre-
sents that he possesses and will employ the degree of learning and skill
usually possessed by those in good standing practicing their specialties
in the same location.""15
The special relationship in Local 75, United Furniture Workers of
America v. Regiecn 6 was not as obvious as those in the other cases, but it
was present nonetheless. The union, having established the insurance pro-
gram, had ready access to the requested information. The union was, in
effect, in the business of providing this information to members such as the
plaintiff.117 The plaintiff had every reason to rely upon the union's informa-
110. 175 Md. at 296, 1 A.2d at 901.
111. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
112. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
113. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
114. 235 P.2d 253 (Cal. App. 1951).
115. Id. at 257.
116. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
117. The secretary to the union's business manager, who handled the insurance
program :
was fully aware that the length of extended policy coverage after layoff depended
entirely upon whether a union member had or had not made contributions to the
insurance fund for more than twelve months. She . . . acknowledged that[,] in
the normal course of her duty, hospitals all over the city daily made inquiries to
her whether insurance coverage of union members provided under contracts be-
tween the union and employers was in effect as to particular individuals.
19 Md. App. at 408, 311 A.2d at 457.
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tion, and the union, knowing the importance of the information, was under
a duty to use care in ascertaining its accuracy. The question remaining
unanswered by the cases is what precise degree of relationship must exist
before recovery will be allowed. For example, it is not yet certain whether
in Maryland a plaintiff can recover in negligence for misrepresentations
made by a defendant with whom the plaintiff has entered into a contract
following arms-length bargaining when the misrepresentations are part of
the basis of the bargain. Such recovery has been allowed in New Hamp-
shire 18 and New York,1 9 and there seems to be nothing on the face of
the rule in Virginia Dare120 that would require denial of recovery in this
situation. But the fact that no Maryland case has thus far allowed recovery
presents a question as to the viability of a negligence action under such a
circumstance.
Contributory Negligence
In Cunningham v. C.R. Pease, Inc., 2 1 cited by the Court of Appeals
in support of the Virginia Dare rule,122 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
indicated that in that state, contributory negligence existed as a defense to
an action for negligent misrepresentation, but not to an action for deceit.123
Maryland apparently differs from New Hampshire in this respect in that
contributory negligence is a defense to both actions here: The require-
ment of plaintiff's reasonable reliance in a deceit action has been strictly
applied in the past to preclude recovery where the plaintiff carelessly
allowed himself to be victimized by the defendant. 124
In negligent misrepresentation actions the standard of care required
of the plaintiff by Maryland courts does not appear to differ from that
required in other negligence actions. The issue of contributory negligence
was specifically addressed in two cases and in both the jury's findings in
favor of the plaintiff were upheld. The defendant in Virginia Dare sought
on appeal a ruling that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. The court rejected this contention, stating that "the servant
118. In Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 A. 141 (1925), plaintiff and defendant
had been parties to an arms-length bargain concerning the purchase and sale of a
farm.
119. As stated in International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 344 N.Y. 331, 338, 155
N.E. 662, 664 (1927) :
An inquiry made of a stranger is one thing; of a person with whom the inquirer
has entered, or is about to enter, a contract concerning the goods which are, or
are to be, its subject, is another. Even here the inquiry must be made as to the
basis of independent action.
120. See text accompanying notes 61 & 68 supra.
121. 74 N.H. 435, 69 A. 120 (1908).
122. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
123. 74 N.H. at 437, 69 A. at 121.
124. E.g., Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 60 A. 609 (1905). See also Piper v.
Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 313-14, 113 A.2d 919, 921-22 (1955) ; Buschman v. Codd, 52
Md. 202 (1879), discussed in note 23 supra.
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who sustained injuries, because relying on the supposed superior knowledge
of a party who assumed control over his labor was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."' 125 Finally, it held that the issue of con-
tributory negligence was properly before the jury because the danger had
not been "obvious" to the plaintiff considering all the circumstances sur-
rounding the case.126 In Local 75, United Furniture Workers of America
v. Regiec,127 the court briefly considered whether the plaintiff's loss of the
pamphlet explaining his insurance program and his failure to examine its
provisions amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law. Re-
jecting this contention, the court pointed out that had plaintiff read the
pamphlet, he would have been no better informed concerning his own
coverage. 128 It is worth comment that contributory negligence was at issue
neither in Brack v. Evans129 nor in St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manu-
facturer's Life Insurance Co. 1 30 In situations of the sort presented by those
cases, where the plaintiff proves reliance upon the special knowledge or
expertise of the defendant, contributory negligence will seldom be a valid
defense. By holding himself out to have special knowledge and skill, the
defendant effectively releases the plaintiff from any duty to ascertain the
accuracy of the defendant's representation.
Confusion: The Problem of Delmarva Drilling Co. v.
Tuckahoe Shopping Center
The development in Maryland of the tort of negligent misrepresentation
has not proceeded without setback. The Court of Appeals recently issued
an opinion in which this remedy was held, in effect, not to exist. In
Delmarva Drilling Co. v. Tuckahoe Shopping Centerl s' the court heard an
appeal by a well drilling company held liable as a third party defendant at
a bench trial for negligence and breach of contract. Delmarva Drilling
Company had assured the owner of the Tuckahoe Shopping Center, the
third party plaintiff, 132 that it could produce useable water for the shopping
center. The basis of Tuckahoe's declaration was that the water was so
filthy that it was unfit for use. The amended third party complaint alleged
that Delmarva Drilling Company had "negligently and recklessly" mis-
represented to Tuckahoe "that it would be all right to connect the building
water system to the well drilled by . . . [Delmarva] and have the tenants
125. 175 Md. at 296, 1 A.2d at 901.
126. Id. at 298, 1 A.2d at 902.
127. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
128. Id. at 413-14, 311 A.2d at 460.
129. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
130. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
131. 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973).
132. Tuckahoe had been the defendant in the action brought by one of its
lessees, a laundromat operator, for breach of the lease agreement by Tuckahoe to
supply water to the lessee.
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take occupancy." 133 The trial court found that certain statements by Del-
marva, to the effect that it "could and would produce useable water,"
amounted to negligent misrepresentations and awarded judgment to Tucka-
hoe on the basis of negligence.134 Apparently in the erroneous belief that
the basis of Tuckahoe's third party complaint and the trial court's judgment
had been deceit, the Court of Appeals reversed.J35 The court reiterated the
traditional scienter requirement for a deceit action:
As we have noted, [the trial judge] was also of the view that Delmarva
was liable to Tuckahoe in tort for what he termed a "negligent mis-
representation." Our predecessors held, in accordance with what con-
tinues to be the prevailing weight of authority, that there can be no
recovery in an action for deceit on the ground of negligent misrepre-
sentation .... 136
This accurate statement of the rule to be applied in a deceit action did
not belong in an action for negligent misrepresentation. Recovery in
negligence for false statements had been developed precisely because the
deceit action was inadequate to provide a remedy in situations where scienter
could not be proven. It may be advisable to consider Delmarva Drilling
Co. as an aberration in the otherwise consistent development of this tort,
especially because the opinion contained no citation to any of the earlier
negligent misrepresentation cases. The Delmarva decision seems to have
been ignored by the Court of Special Appeals when it issued its opinion in
133. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at E. 28, Delmarva Drilling Co. v. Tuckahoe
Shopping Center, 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973).
134. Id. at E. 50-52 (emphasis in original).
135. 268 Md. at 425, 302 A.2d at 40-41. It is obvious from a reading of Tuckahoe's
third party complaint that no theory of fraud or deceit had ever been advanced. The
words "fraud" and "fraudulent" are mentioned nowhere in the complaint. The charges
are confined to breach of contract (paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 7) and reckless and negligent
misrepresentations (paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7). Appendix to Brief for Appellant at
E. 28-29. Furthermore, the order of the trial court implies that the trial judge did
not consider the claim to be one for deceit:
Tuckahoe in its very able brief called the attention of the Court to the case of
Fowler, et al. v. Benton, et al. . . . [That] suit was for fraud and deceit rather
than negligent misrepresentation. However, the Court agrees that the principles
discussed... are applicable to the case at bar.
Id. at E. 49-50 (emphasis added). Nowhere else in the trial court's opinion are the
words "fraud" or "deceit" mentioned.
136. 268 Md. at 427, 302 A.2d at 41. The court also mentioned, quite properly,
that Delmarva's statements could not support an action for deceit because they were
"mere promises"; a necessary element of actionable fraud is the misrepresentation of a
past or present fact. Id. at 427, 302 A.2d at 41-42. See also Boulden v. Stilwell, 100
Md. 543, 60 A. 609 (1905). Whether the statements could have supported a negligence
action, as held by the trial judge, is perhaps a much closer question. The misrepre-
sentations in Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963), discussed in text
accompanying notes 90-93 supra, were statements of neither past nor present fact,
yet they were held to be actionable.
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Local 75, United Furniture Workers of America v. Regiec'37 later the same
year. While the Court of Special Appeals' analysis was not without serious
inaccuracies, 13 8 the court was careful to distinguish between the torts of
deceit and of negligent misrepresentation following the line of decisions
from Virginia Dare through Brack v. Evans.3 9 Until the issue is once
again before the Court of Appeals, however, Delmarva Drilling Co. will
remain as an element of uncertainty in the development of the law.
CONCLUSION
Considering the uncertain status of the action for negligent misrepre-
sentation in Maryland, it seems most desirable that our courts reaffirm the
rule in Virginia Dare and apply it without tacking on special restrictions or
qualifications, paying particular heed to the traditional negligence concepts
of proximate cause and contributory negligence to avoid excessively sweep-
ing applications of the rule. The action for negligent misrepresentation was
created to provide a tort remedy for the plaintiff who had acted reasonably
in reliance upon the false statement of a defendant whose conduct in uttering
the statement was culpably careless, but not deliberately fraudulent, and
who was aware that the plaintiff would reasonably act in reliance upon the
statement. This purpose should be broadly effectuated, for in a legal system
that predicates tort liability upon fault it is reasonable that a defendant
whose careless words have caused injury should bear the burden of loss.
Injustices that may arise from a broad application of the Virginia Dare
rule are few and can be easily avoided. 140 It is to be hoped that the decision
137. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A2d 456 (1973).
138. In analyzing the case law, the court asserted that the original rule, as set
forth in Virginia Dare, had been successively broadened by statements in Holt v.
Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A2d 287 (1949), and Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 113
A.2d 919 (1955). Actually, as previously noted, the court in Holt had restricted the
rule to actions involving personal injury. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
The Court of Special Appeals' analysis of Piper was also confusing, as the court
indicated that Piper had materially expanded the scope of the action for negligent
misrepresentation, 19 Md. App. at 411-12, 311 A.2d at 459, yet Piper was an action
for deceit arising out of misrepresentations relating to a sale of land in an arms-length
bargaining situation. At the time of the decision in Piper, recovery in negligence
might not have been available under such circumstances because only pecuniary loss
had been involved. The statements in Piper pertaining to negligent misrepresentation
were thus no more than a tangential recapitulation of the law on that subject, not
pertinent to the facts in Piper. The court in Regiec also stated that this supposed
extension of the Virginia Dare rule was followed in Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548,
187 A.2d 880 (1963), but in fact, it was in Brack that the actual extension of the
prior rule took place in order to cover circumstances of pecuniary loss as well as
circumstances of personal injury.
139. 130 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
140. Apart from the dangers described so vividly in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven
& Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), discussed in text accompanying notes
97-98 supra, one other serious possibility of injustice comes readily to mind: If an
individual (X) asks a third person (Z) whether a second person (Y) is a good
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of the Court of Special Appeals in Local 75, United Furniture Workers v.
Regiec is an indication that the Maryland courts will now treat negligent
misrepresentation as a bona fide cause of action and permit it a liberal
scope.
credit risk, and if X then enters into a contract with Y on the strength of Z's negligent
affirmation, and Y intentionally breaches the contract with X, X could conceivably
recover double damages, from Y in contract and from Z for negligence. Even if the
court were to refuse to permit a double recovery, X would be more likely to sue Z, the
less culpable party, because the tort remedy is not confined by the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). This problem was discussed in the context
of deceit by Justice Grose in his dissent to Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450
(K.B. 1789). The answer is simply not to allow recovery for negligent misrepresenta-
tion under these circumstances unless the contract remedy is unavailable or in-
sufficient.
